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ESSAYS
FINANCIAL STATEMENT REPORTING OF PENDING
LITIGATION: ATTORNEYS, AUDITORS, AND
DIFFERENCES OF OPINIONS
W. R. Koprowski, Ph.D., J.D. *
Steven J Arsenault,LL.M, J.D.t
Michael Cipriano,Ph.D., C.P.A. +
What we've got here is a failure to communicate. 1

I. INTRODUCTION

Pending litigation can be a significant source of potential liability
for public companies. The lack of adequate disclosure of this potential
liability has caused confusion for investors, lenders, and other financial
statement users. Auditors are required to assess the appropriateness of
financial statement disclosures regarding pending litigation. However,
the auditor's ability to do so depends upon receiving information from
the company's attorneys. Obtaining this information, however, is problematic because the accounting and auditing standards that guide
auditors and the professional standards that guide attorneys have been at
odds for the past thirty years. Recent scandals 2 have resulted in
* Assistant Professor of Accounting and Legal Studies and Department, College of
Charleston. Ph.D., Temple University; J.D., University of South Carolina School of
Law.
' Associate Professor of Accounting and Legal Studies, College of Charleston. LL.M.,
University of Florida College of Law; J.D., University of South Carolina School of
Law.
± Assistant Professor of Accounting and Director of Master's of Accountancy Program,
College of Charleston. Ph.D., University of South Carolina.
1. COOL HAND LUKE (Warner Brothers Pictures 1967).
2. Scandals in recent years began with Enron and soon included MCI-Worldcom,
Tyco International, Adelphia, Rite Aid, and many others. See Scott Harshbarger &
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legislation3 and increased scrutiny of the disclosure of contingent
liabilities from pending litigation, thus magnifying this conflict between
auditors and attorneys.
Parts II and III of this Article discuss the U.S. accounting standards
and auditing standards applicable to pending litigation.
Part IV
identifies the issues raised by communications between attorneys and
auditors, including the attorney-client privilege, the work product
doctrine, and the American Bar Association guidelines 4 on communications with a client's auditor. Part V describes three possible solutions
offered by previous commentators to the conflict between attorneys and
auditors and an assessment of the viability of these solutions. Finally,
Part VI provides our conclusions and a recommendation for addressing
this conflict.

II. U.S. ACCOUNTING

STANDARDS REGARDING PENDING LITIGATION

Certified Public Accountants ("CPAs") 5 play a critical role in the
U.S. financial markets. Investors and lenders rely heavily on the information provided in a company's financial statements in making investment, lending, and other decisions regarding business with a particular
company. As independent auditors, CPAs express their opinion reGoutam U. Jois, Looking Back and Looking Forward: Sarbanes-Oxley and the Future
of Corporate Governance, 40 AKRON L. REv. 1 (2007); Gregory C. Leon, Stigmata:
The Stain ofSarbanes-Oxley on U.S. CapitalMarkets, 9 DUQ. Bus. L.J. 125 (2007).
3. These scandals led to the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29
U.S.C.).
4. See infra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
5. A Certified Public Accountant is a professional who has met the requirements
of his state board of accountancy, which include completing a program of study in
accounting at a college or university, passing the national Uniform CPA Exam, and
obtaining a specific amount of professional work experience in public accounting. See
AICPA Media Center-Frequently Asked Questions, Becoming a CPA, Question 2,
http://www.aicpa.org/MediaCenter/FAQs.htm#cpaanswer2
(last visited Dec. 29,
2009). Certified Public Accountants may perform many different services for their
clients, including tax return advice and preparation, bookkeeping, valuation services,
management consulting and information system consulting, as well as auditing a
client's financial statements. It is the audit function that is critical for purposes of this
article. As an auditor, the independent certified public accountant issues an opinion that
the public corporation's financial statements are or are not presented fairly in
accordance with the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). See United
States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 817-18 (1984).
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garding the reliability and integrity of a publicly traded company's
financial statements based upon their examination and testing of the
company's books and records. 6 The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized
the important role auditor's play, as discussed in the following
statement:
The independent public accountant performing this special function
[the audit] owes ultimate allegiance to the corporation's creditors
and stockholders, as well as to the investing public. This "public
watchdog" function demands that the accountant maintain total
independence from the client at all times and requires complete
fidelity to the public trust. 7

As one commentator describes it, the auditor's duty is "to the reader of

the client's financial reports and is public in nature." 8
To form their opinion as to the fairness of the company's financial
statements, the auditors must determine which items are material to the
financial condition of the company, and this determination is "a matter
of professional judgment made in light of surrounding circumstances,
and necessarily involves both quantitative and qualitative considerations." 9
Since 1973, the financial accounting principles that govern the
preparation of financial statements for public companies have been the
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles ("GAAP"), issued by the
Financial Accounting Standards Board ("FASB").'° GAAP is "a technical accounting term that encompasses the conventions, rules, and
procedures necessary to define accepted accounting practice ... and...
provide a standard by which to measure financial presentations.""
Thus, the FASB is the organization recognized as setting accounting and

6. See infra notes 35-47 and accompanying text.
7. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. at 817-18.
8. John W. Allen, Ethicaland Liability Risks in Auditor Response Letters, 77-JAN
FLA. B.J. 10, 10 (2003).
9. Charles D. Lee, When Professions Collide-Lawyers' Reponses to Auditors'
Requests, 61-FEB J. KAN. B.A. 27, 27 (1992).
10.
Statement of Policy on the Establishment and Improvement of Accounting
Principles and Standards, Accounting Series Release No. 150, 28 Fed. Reg. 2261 (Dec.
20, 1973).
11.

THE MEANING OF "PRESENT FAIRLY IN CONFORMITY WITH GENERALLY

ACCEPTED ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES,"

Statement on Auditing Standards No. 69, §

411.02 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1992).
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12
reporting standards in the United States.
With regard to pending litigation, the relevant accounting standard
is Statement of Financial Accounting Standard ("SFAS") No. 5Accounting for Contingencies, 13 which provides the criteria for determining whether a company must accrue or disclose loss contingencies. 4
Under these standards, a loss contingency is defined as "an existing
condition, situation, or set of circumstances involving uncertainty ... to
an enterprise that will ultimately be resolved when one or more future
events occur or fail to occur." 15 While SFAS No. 5 does not provide
specific guidance related to the disclosure of potential losses from
litigation against an enterprise as of a particular balance sheet date, the
inclusion of an extensive example involving unresolved litigation within
an interpretation 16 of SFAS No. 5 issued by the FASB indicates that
pending litigation has been an important type of loss contingency for
several decades. 17
Under SFAS No. 5, a potential loss resulting from pending litigation is to be accrued when it is "probable that one or more future
events will occur confirming the fact of the loss" and when "the amount
of the loss can be reasonably estimated."18 If an enterprise determines
that one or both of those conditions have not been met, SFAS No. 5

12.
Commission Statement of Policy Reaffirming the Status of the FASB as a
Designated Private-Sector Standard Setter, Securities Act Release No. 8221, Exchange
Act Release No. 47,743, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,028, 80 SEC Docket
183 (Apr. 25, 2003) (indicating that the FASB accounting standards are recognized as
"generally accepted" for U.S. security laws). For a recent examination of a proposal for
the U.S. to move to a new set of international accounting standards, see Lawrence A.
Cunningham, The SEC's Global Accounting Vision: A RealisticAppraisal of a Quixotic
Quest, 87 N.C. L. REv. 1 (2008).
13. ACCOUNTING FOR CONTINGENCIES, Statement of Fin. Accounting Standards
No. 5 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1975) [hereinafter FAS No. 5].
14. Id. at 8-13.
15. Id.at 1.
16. REASONABLE ESTIMATION OF THE AMOUNT OF A Loss, FASB Interpretation No.
14 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1976).
17. Id. at 4-6.
18. FAS No. 5, supra note 13, at 8. Commentators have described the process as
a sequential decision-making process, first determining whether the amount is material,
and if so, determining whether the occurrence of a future loss is "probable" or
"reasonably possible," and, finally, determining whether the future loss is "remote."
See Joseph Aharony & Amihud Dotan, A Comparative Analysis of Auditor, Manager
and FinancialAnalyst Interpretations of SFAS 5 Disclosure Guidelines, 31 J. Bus. FIN.
& ACCT. 475, 475-76 (2004).
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requires the enterprise to disclose loss contingency when "there is at
least a reasonable possibility that a loss . . . may have occurred." 1 9 This
disclosure "shall give an estimate of the possible loss or range of loss or
state that such an estimate cannot be made., 20 Neither accrual nor disclosure is required when the probability of the future event(s) occurring
that would trigger the loss for the enterprise is considered to be remote,
which SFAS No. 5 defines as being "slight".21
For decades, academics, regulators, and investors have expressed
frustration with the lack of disclosure of information related to, and
accruals for, pending litigation given the standards set forth in SFAS No.
5 and FIN 14.22 For example, the author of a study of one of the most
significant corporate lawsuits of the 1980s, Pennzoil's $14 billion
lawsuit against Texaco,23 found that Texaco, in its 1986 financial
statements, failed to accrue any portion of the more than $9.1 billion
judgment it was ordered to pay Pennzoil during that year.24 Within days
of filing its 1986 financial statements with the SEC in early 1987,
however, Texaco filed for bankruptcy protection 25 and began negotiating
with Pennzoil for a settlement through the proceedings of the bankruptcy
court. 26In its 1987 financial statements filed twelve months later, Texaco
revealed that the bankruptcy was the result of the Pennzoil judgment and
accrued the approximately $3 billion that it ultimately settled on paying
Pennzoil in December 1987.27 While Texaco was sure enough that it
was going to be paying Pennzoil enough money to warrant filing

19.
FAS No. 5, supra note 13, at 10.
20. Id.
21.
Id. at 3. See Aharaony & Dotan, supra note 18, at 478 (describing differences
in the interpretation of the terms "remote" and "probable" by financial analysts, auditors
and managers). See generally Kenneth E. Harrison & Lawrence A. Tomassini, Judging
the Probabilityof a ContingentLoss: An EmpiricalStudy, 5 COMTEMP. ACCT. REs. 642
(1989) (describing differences in auditors' interpretation of the terms "reasonably
possible" and "probable").
22.
See infra notes 23-34 and accompanying text.
23.
Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 729 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. App. 1987).
For
subsequent proceedings regarding the enforceability of the resulting judgment, see
Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 626 F. Supp. 250 (S.D.N.Y.), modified, 784 F.2d 1133 (2d
Cir. 1986), rev'd481 U.S. 1 (1987).
24. Edward B. Deakin, Accounting for Contingencies: The Pennzoil-Texaco Case,
3 ACCT. HORIZONs 21, 25 (1989).
25.
See In re Texaco Inc., 73 B.R. 960 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987).
26. Deakin, supra note 24, at 26-27.
27. TEXACO, INC., 1987 ANNUAL REPORT 16 (1988).
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bankruptcy in April 1987, it was apparently unable to supply even the
low end of a range for what the potential amount of the settlement was
going to be in its financial statements filed that same month.28
More recently, SEC Deputy Chief Accountant Scott Taub noted it is
"somewhat surprising the number of instances where zero is considered
the low end of a range with no number more likely than any other right
up until a large settlement is announced." 29 Regarding financial statement disclosures, Taub said that "these situations are also often the ones
for which no significant disclosure has been made in the financial
statement before the settlement is announced." 30 Taub's comments are
supported by an SEC empirical study which revealed that while 64% of
SEC registrants sampled reported being sued, only 9.5% of them
accrued any liability for pending litigation on their financial statements." A footnote in the same SEC report indicates that "approximately 97% of the $23,761 billion of potential legal contingent losses
disclosed for the entire sample relate to instances where no liability was
reported as being recognized on the balance sheet."32
There are other examples of under-accruals for pending litigation
that demonstrate that financial statement disclosure is not moving in a
direction consistent with the kind of transparency that Taub and
investors desire. For example, Wall Street estimated Merck's total
Vioxx liability somewhere between $5 and $50 billion.3 3 At the same
time, however, while Merck's management estimated revenues of $22
billion, the company did not set aside any reserves for potential liability

28.

Things haven't changed much since the late 1980s. See J. DAVID SPICELAND ET
632 (4th ed. 2007) (noting that "ExxonMobil,
disclosed but did not accrue damages from a [$56,000,000] lawsuit it lost, even after the
award was affirmed by trial court").
29. Scott A. Taub, Deputy Chief Accountant, U.S. Sec. and Exchange Comm'n,
Speech by SEC Staff: Remarks at the University of Southern California Leventhal
School of Accounting SEC and Financial Reporting Conference (May 27, 2004)
(transcript available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch052704sat.htm).
AL., INTERMEDIATE ACCOUNTING

30.
31.

Id.
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ACCOUNTANT, OFFICE OF ECON. ANALYSIS,

Div.

OF CORP.

FIN., SEC. AND EXCHANGE COMM'N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS PURSUANT TO
SECTION

401(c)

OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF

2002

ON ARRANGEMENTS WITH OFF-

BALANCE SHEET IMPLICATIONS, SPECIAL PURPOSE ENTITIES, AND TRANSPARENCY OF

FILINGS BY ISSUERS

32.

33.

69-70 (2005).

Id. at 72 n. 175.
John Goff, Coming Distractions,CFO MAG., Apr. 1, 2006, at 4.
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relating to the Vioxx litigation.34

These examples illustrate a clear problem: while the legal exposure
of public companies has grown exponentially, the accrual of loss contingencies has remained as woefully limited as it was decades ago.
III. U.S. AUDITING STANDARDS FOR PENDING LITIGATION

As a public company's management prepares its financial
statements, they work with internal and external counsel to appropriately
categorize loss contingencies in accordance with GAAP.35 Auditors are
responsible for determining if their clients' categorizations and subsequent disclosures and accruals, or lack thereof, are in accordance with
GAAP, given the evidence they gather in an audit performed in
compliance with the standards of the Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board ("PCAOB").3 6 The auditor's goal is to provide an
independent report on whether the company's financial statements
present fairly the financial position of the company in conformance with

34. Id. In its filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission, Merck
described potential liabilities from the Vioxx litigation as follows.
The Company believes that it has meritorious defenses to the Vioxx Lawsuits and will
vigorously defend against them. In view of the inherent difficulty of predicting the
outcome of litigation, particularly where there are many claimants and the claimants
seek indeterminate damages, the Company is unable to predict the outcome of these
matters, and at this time cannot reasonably estimate the possible loss or range of loss
with respect to the Vioxx Lawsuits. The Company has not established any reserves
for any potential liability relating the Vioxx Lawsuits or the Vioxx Investigations,
including for those cases in which verdicts or judgments have been entered against the
Company, and are now in post-verdict proceedings or on appeal. In each of those
cases the Company believes it has strong points to raise on appeal and therefore that
unfavorable outcomes in such cases are not probable. Unfavorable outcomes in the
Vioxx Litigation (as defined below) could have a material adverse effect on the
Company's financial position, liquidity and results of operations.
Merck & Co. Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 22 (Feb. 28, 2007).
35.

See INQUIRY OF A CLIENT'S LAWYER CONCERNING LITIGATION, CLAIMS, AND

ASSESSMENTS, Statement on Auditing Standards No. 12, § 337.02 (Am. Inst. of
Certified Pub. Accountants 1976) ("Management is responsible for adopting policies
and procedures to identify, evaluate, and account for litigation, claims, and assessments
as a basis for the preparation of financial statements in conformity with generally
accepted accounting principles.").
36.

REFERENCES IN

AUDITORS'

REPORT TO THE STANDARDS

OF THE

PUBLIC

COMPANY ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BOARD, AUDITING AND RELATED PROFESSIONAL

PRACTICE STANDARDS, Auditing Standard No. 1, at
2004).

3 (Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd.
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GAPP,37 including disclosures and accruals for contingent liabilities.
Statement of Auditing Standards ("SAS") No. 1238 provides the
guidelines the auditor must follow in gathering such evidence from the
client's attorneys. 39 Although it was issued in January 1976, SAS No.
12 remains the operative auditing standard today even after the
enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the creation of the PCAOB.4 °
Under SAS No. 12, as codified within the AICPA Professional
Standards in AU Sec. 337,41 the auditor must obtain evidence regarding
the existence of circumstances indicating an uncertainty as to the
possible loss to an entity arising from litigation, claims and assessments;
the period in which the underlying cause for legal action occurred; the
degree of probability of an unfavorable outcome; and the amount or
range of potential loss. 42 Because auditors do not have legal training
and therefore do not possess the skills necessary to make legal
judgments concerning this information, auditors should request that the
client's management send a letter of inquiry to attorneys with whom
43
management consulted concerning litigation, claims, and assessments.
The "letter of audit inquiry" from the auditors to the client's lawyer "is
the primary means of obtaining corroborating evidence
of the
44
information furnished by management concerning litigation."
The letter of audit inquiry should address specific matters like
identification of the company, including subsidiaries; the date of the
audit; a list prepared by management that describes and evaluates
pending or threatened litigation, claims, and assessments with respect

37. See Lee, supra note 9, at 27.
38.
INQUIRY OF A CLIENT'S LAWYER CONCERNING LITIGATION, CLAIMS AND
ASSESSMENTS, Statement on Auditing Standards No. 12, § 337 (Am. Inst. of Certified
Pub. Accountants 1976) [hereinafter SAS No. 12].
39. Byron F. Egan, Communicating with Auditors After the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
41-FALL TEX. J. Bus. L. 131, 196 (2005).
40. The PCAOB has adopted the generally accepted auditing standards as they
existed on April 16, 2003 as the interim PCAOB standards until further guidance is
issued. See PCAOB Rulemaking: Public Company Accounting Oversight Board; Order
Approving Proposed Auditing Standard No. 1, References in Auditors' Reports to the
Standards of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, Exchange Act Release
No. 49,707 (May 14, 2004).
41.
SAS No. 12, supra note 38.
42. Id. § 337.04.

43.

RELATED PARTIES,

Statement on Auditing Standards No. 45, § 334.06 (Am.

Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1983).
44.
SAS No. 12, supra note 38, at § 337.08.
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that the attorney has been engaged in and has devoted substantive
attention to in the form of legal representation; and a list prepared by
management that describes and evaluates unasserted claims and
assessments that management considers to be probable of assertion and
that, if asserted, would have at least a reasonable possibility of an
unfavorable outcome, with respect to which the attorney has been
engaged and devoted attention in the form of legal representation. 45 The
auditor should request that the attorney "describe and evaluate pending
or threatened litigation, [including the] progress of the case to date... an
evaluation of the likelihood of an unfavorable outcome and estimate, if
one can be made, of the amount or range of the potential lOSS., 4 6 With
regard to unasserted claims and assessments, the attorney should also be
requested to disclose if his views "differ from those stated by management. , 4 7
IV. COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN ATTORNEYS AND AUDITORS

Communications between attorneys and auditors are hindered by
the legal and ethical standards that each group must adhere to in their
representation of the client company. The auditors are guided by the
auditing standards discussed above. Attorneys, on the other hand, are
limited in what they may disclose due to the application of the attorneyclient privilege and the work product doctrine. The discussion below
addresses the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine
generally, followed by a discussion of the American Bar Association's
guidance on communications with a client's auditors.
A. The Attorney-Client Privilege

The attorney-client privilege is the oldest privilege recognized by
the law. 48 The confidentiality that it guarantees is considered a fundamental principle of the attorney-client relationship 49 , encouraging the
client to freely discuss relevant information with their attorney without
fear of disclosure to allow the attorney to provide adequate legal

45.

Id. § 337.09(a)-(c).

46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. § 337.09(d)(1)-(2).
Id. § 337.09(d)(3).
See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 2 (2002).
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representation. 50 Corporations are generally entitled to the same protection under the attorney-client privilege as individuals.5 1
The attorney-client privilege protects confidential communications
between a client and their attorney from disclosure in any civil or
criminal proceeding. 5 2 The privilege, however, is not unlimited. For
example, the privilege only applies where the communication is made in
the context of the attorney providing legal advice; if the attorney 5is3
providing general business advice, the privilege does not apply.
Moreover, while the privilege applies to communications between the
attorney and the client, it does not protect the facts underlying those
communications.5 4 Likewise, the privilege may be waived if the privileged communications are made available to a third party outside the
attorney-client relationship." As discussed in detail below, it is the
potential for this waiver that is raised by the communications between
the attorney and the auditor in response to the auditor's request for
information.
B. The Work Product Doctrine
The work product doctrine protects an attorney's thought processes,
legal analysis and trial preparation work from disclosure.5 6 Like the
attorney-client privilege, the facts regarding an issue are not protected
by the work product doctrine.5 7 Rather, what is protected is "the work
performed, materials generated and considerations of the lawyers in
connection with the investigation and any recommendations to the

50. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389.
51. Id. at 389-90; MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13 cmt. 2 (2002).
52.
Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389.
53. See, e.g., Hardy v. N.Y. News, Inc., 114 F.R.D. 633 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)
(communications concerning affirmative action programs made to attorney serving as
director of employee relations not privileged).
54.
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395 (1981).
55.
United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 539-40 (5th Cir. 1982) (involving
waiver based on disclosure of internal tax analysis to outside auditors); In re John Doe
Corp., 675 F.2d 482, 488-89 (2d Cir. 1982) (involving waiver based on disclosure of
internal report to outside auditors and underwriters); David M. Brodsky, Updates on the
CorporateAttorney-Client Privilege, 8 SEDONA CONF. J. 89, 90 (2007). For a detailed
discussion of the scope of the waiver of the attorney-client privilege, see Egan, supra
note 39, at 182-87.
56. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947).
57.
Brodsky, supra note 55, at 91.
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company., 58 The theory behind the doctrine is that attorneys should be
allowed to prepare for trial without fear that their work will be required
to be turned over to the other party through discovery requests.5 9 The

common law rule was codified in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(b)(3), which provides as follows:
[A] party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things
otherwise discoverable under subdivision (b)(1) of this rule and
prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial . . . only upon a
showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial need of the
materials in the preparation of the party's case and that the party is
unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of
the materials by other means. In ordering discovery of such
materials when the required showing has been made, the court shall
protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions,
opinions, or legal theories of an60 attorney or other representative of a
party concerning the litigation.

Under this language, the initial question is whether the materials
sought were prepared in anticipation of litigation. 6'

Courts have

interpreted this phrase under either a "primary purpose" approach or a
"because of' approach.6 2

Under the "primary purpose" approach, a

document is prepared in anticipation of litigation only if it is prepared
principally or exclusively to assist in litigation.6 3 Under the "because

of' approach, a document is prepared in anticipation of litigation if it is
created because of the prospect of litigation or because it analyzes the
outcome of litigation. 64 Most courts now recognize the broader
"because of' approach, 65 with the result that work product protection is
58. Id.
59. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511.
60. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
Ricardo Col6n, Caution: Disclosures ofAttorney Work Productto Independent
61.
Auditors May Waive the Privilege, 52 Loy. L. REv. 115, 124-25 (2006) (citing In re
Raytheon Sec. Litig., 218 F.R.D. 354, 357 (D. Mass. 2003)).
Id. at 125 (citing United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1997 (2d Cir. 1998)
62.
(discussing the two interpretations of the term "in anticipation of litigation")).
63. Adlman, 134 F.3d at 1198, n.3.
Id. at 1202.
64.
See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 357 F.3d 900 (9th Cir. 2004); Maine v. U.S.
65.
Dep't of Interior, 298 F.3d 60 (1st Cir. 2002); Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194; Nat'l Union Fire
Ins. Co. v. Murray Sheet Metal Co., 967 F.2d 980 (4th Cir. 1992); Simon v. G.D. Searle
& Co., 816 F.2d 397 (8th Cir. 1987); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 604 F.2d 798 (3d
Cir. 1979).
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extended to documents prepared by attorneys at the request of an
independent auditor if the documents contain an estimate of the likelihood of success in litigation or discusses litigation strategies.6 6
Like the attorney-client privilege, the work product protection is
subject to waiver, but on a more limited basis. 67 For example, merely
disclosing information subject to the work product protection to a third
party with a common interest will not result in a waiver. 68 Likewise,
disclosure subject to a confidentiality agreement has been found to avoid
waiver given that the agreement is evidence of an attempt to protect the
information for disclosure to the opposing party. 69 However, widespread disclosure could lead to a waiver, as could disclosure to a
government agency,70 particularly where the agency is an adversarial
party.

71

C. ABA Guidance on Communications with a Client'sAuditor
In responding to the auditor's letter of inquiry, the client's attorney
must be careful not to disclose information that results in a waiver of the
attorney-client privilege or information protected by the work product
doctrine. In response to this concern, the American Bar Association
provided guidance to attorneys by publishing its "Statement of Policy
Regarding Lawyers' Responses to Auditors' Requests for Information"

in 1975.72
Unlike the required adherence to accounting and auditing standards,
the Statement of Policy is "desirable" but not mandatory.
Moreover,
with the primary focus on the preservation of the attorney-client and
work product doctrine privileges, the Statement of Policy does little to
assist the auditor in their quest for disclosure. The Statement of Policy
addresses this issue as follows:
66. Col6n, supra note 61, at 125-26 (citing Adiman, 134 F.3d at 1200).
67. See Egan, supra note 39, at 191.
68. United States v. Gulf Oil Corp., 760 F.2d 292, 296 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.
1985).
69. Egan, supra note 39, at 191 (citing Blanchard v. EdgeMark Fin. Corp., 192
F.R.D. 233, 237 (N.D. Il. 2000)).
70. See Blanchard, 192 F.R.D. at 237.
71.
United States v. Jones, 696 F.2d 1069, 1072 (4th Cir. 1982). For a more
detailed discussion of this theory of waiver, see Egan, supra note 39, at 191 n.260.
72. ABA Statement of Policy RegardingLawyers' Responses to Auditors' Requests
for Information, 31 Bus. LAW. 1709 (1976) [hereinafter ABA Statement ofPolicy].
73. Id. at 1710.
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It is also recognized that our legal, political and economic systems
depend to an important extent on public confidence in published
financial statements. To meet this need the accounting profession
must adopt and adhere to standards and procedures that will
command confidence in the auditing process. It is not, however,
believed necessary, or sound public policy, to intrude upon the
confidentiality of74the lawyer-client relationship in order to command
such confidence.

The ABA concern regarding potential waiver of the attorney-client
privilege and work product doctrine is substantiated by case law.
Regarding the attorney-client privilege, federal courts have consistently
held that disclosure to independent auditors of information subject to the

attorney-client privilege destroys the confidentiality and therefore
waives the privilege. 75 As both courts and commentators have recog-

nized, however, the waiver of the attorney-client privilege does not
automatically preclude protection under the work product doctrine.76
Thus, the issue becomes whether disclosure to independent auditors
effects a waiver of the work product doctrine as well.
As discussed above,7 7 unlike the attorney-client privilege, merely
disclosing information subject to the work product protection does not
automatically waive the protection. Rather, the issue is whether the disclosure substantially increases the opportunity for potential adversaries
to obtain the information.7 8 Thus, courts have been required to address

the question of whether the third party to whom the protected information is disclosed is or should be considered an adversary.79 Disclosure of protected information to a third party who shares a common
interest with the disclosing party does not result in a waiver.80 The
question then is whether the independent auditor, to whom the audit
74.
Id.
75.
United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 540 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding that
company waived the attorney-client privilege as to documents disclosed to its
independent auditors); In re Pfizer, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 90 Civ. 1260 (SS), 1993 WL
561125, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 1993); Col6n, supra note 61, at 122-23.
76. Col6n, supra note 61, at 123 (citing Medinol, Ltd. v. Boston Scientific Corp.,
214 F.R.D. 113, 114 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)).
77. See supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
78. In re Pfizer, 1993 WL 561125, at*6.
79. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. v. Allegheny Energy, Inc., 229 F.R.D. 441, 446
(S.D.N.Y. 2004).
80. Id. at 446; In re Copper Mkt. Antitrust Litig., 200 F.R.D. 213, 221 n.6
(S.D.N.Y. 2001); In re Pfizer, 1993 WL 561125, at *6.
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are disclosed, should be considered

an

In addressing this question, two approaches have emerged in the
courts. The first approach is illustrated by In re Pfizer, Inc. Securities
Litigation. 8' In that case, the court held that Pfizer and its auditor shared
common interests in the information disclosed and that the auditor
therefore is not reasonably viewed as a conduit to a potential adversary.8 2 Several courts that considered the issue have adopted this
analysis.83 In the words of one court, "the' fact that an independent
auditor must remain independent from the company it audits does not
establish that the auditor also has an adversarial relationship with the
client as contemplated by the work product doctrine. 84
The second approach is based on a 2002 case, Medinol, Ltd. v.
Boston Scientific Corp.8 5, which emphasized the "public watchdog role"
of independent auditors. 86 This approach focuses on the required independent nature of auditors, observing that "in order for auditors to
properly do their job, they must not share common interests with the
company they audit. 87 It should be noted that, while the Medinol
approach is still under consideration by the courts, many courts seem to
find the reasoning of the Pfizer approach more persuasive.88
Other courts have found the role of the independent auditor to
increase substantially the opportunities for potential adversaries to obtain the information in the audit letter based on the disclosure duties the

81.
In re Pfizer, 1993 WL 561125.
82.
Id. at *6.
83. See Gutter v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., No. 95 Civ. 2152, 1998 WL
2107926, at *5 (S.D. Fla. May 18, 1998); Gramm v. Horsehead Indus., Inc., No. 87 Civ.
5122, 1990 WL 142404, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 1990). See Merrill Lynch & Co., 229
F.R.D. at 447-49, for a detailed discussion of the some of the policy reasons behind one
court's decision that auditors should not be treated as adversaries to their audit clients.
84. Lawrence E. Jaffe Pension Plan v. Household Int'l, Inc., 237 F.R.D. 176, 183
(N.D. Ill. 2006).
85. Medinol, Ltd. v. Boston Scientific Corp., 214 F.R.D. 113 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
86. Id. at 116 (quoting United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 817-18
(1984)).
87. Medinol, Ltd., 214 F.R.D. at 116 (emphasis in original).
88. Vacco v. Harrah's Operating Co., Inc., No. 1:07-CV-0663, 2008 WL 4793719,
at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 2008); Am. S.S. Owners Mut. Prot. & Indemnification Ass'n,
Inc. v. Alcoa S.S. Co., Inc., No. 04 Civ. 4309, 2006 WL 278131, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.
2, 2006).
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auditor has to creditors, stockholders and the investing public.8 9 Thus,
to the extent the securities laws and/or relevant accounting standards
mandate public disclosure, a court is likely to find that the materials will
likely be disclosed to the company's adversaries and therefore are not
subject to work product protection.9"
The uncertainty about the likely application and potential waiver of
the attorney-client privilege and, perhaps more importantly, information
covered by the work product doctrine, creates an incentive for this
limited disclosures to the auditor. However, the attorney's limited
disclosure to the auditor creates potential concerns regarding the
auditor's opinion. AU § 337.13 indicates that "a lawyer's refusal to furnish the information requested in an inquiry letter. . would be a
limitation on the scope of the audit sufficient to preclude an unqualified
opinion." 9 Whether a lawyer refuses to furnish all of the information
requested in an inquiry letter or does not provide enough evidence for
the auditor to "support management's assertions about the nature of a
matter involving an uncertainty and its presentation or disclosure in the
financial statements, the auditor should consider the need to express a
qualified or to disclaim an opinion because of a scope limitation. . .if
sufficient evidential matter does or did exist but was not available to the
auditor.,92 Thus, if the communication issues between auditor and

lawyer are such that the audit client's lawyer has information that could
comply with the auditor's request for information related to pending
litigation against the client, but the lawyer does not provide that
information to the auditor due to attorney-client privilege, then the
auditor appears to be bound to qualify or disclaim its opinion given the
current state of U.S. accounting and auditing standards.
Moreover, for public companies (and their attorneys and auditors)
subject to U.S. securities law, Section 303(a) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act

89. In re Raytheon Sec. Litig., 218 F.R.D. 354, 360 (D. Mass. 2003); Diasonics
Sec. Litig., No. C-83-4584-RFP (FW), 1986 WL 53402, at *1 (N.D. Cal. June 15, 1986)
(holding that documents disclosed to an accounting firm acting as an auditor were either
not entitled to work product protection or that such protection was waived as a result of
the disclosure).
90. In re Raytheon, 218 F.R.D. at 360; see also United States v. Gulf Oil Corp., 760
F.2d 292 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1985).
91. SAS No. 12, supra note 38, at § 337.13.
REPORTS ON AUDITED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS, Statement on Auditing
92.
Standards No. 98, § 508.31 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1989) (emphasis
added).
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specifically prohibits any officer or director of the company, or any
other person acting under their direction, "to take any action to
fraudulently influence, coerce, manipulate, or mislead any independent
public or certified accountant engaged in the performance of an audit of
the financial statements of that issuer for the purpose of rendering such
financial statements materially misleading. 9 3 SEC Final Rule 34-47890
codifies Section 303 and notes that these activities "include, but are not
limited to, directly or indirectly. .. (p)roviding an auditor with an inaccurate or misleading legal analysis. 94 Section 303 raises the stakes in
this game between auditor and attorneys of the audit client that is also an
SEC registrant. Where the attorney does not reply to the inquiry letter
from an auditor in a manner which allows the auditor to determine if his
client's financials are free of material misstatement, the attorney risks
assessment of the post-Sarbanes-Oxley heightened penalties associated
with violating federal securities law. 95
V. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

As the above discussion demonstrates, the auditor's goals of
transparency and adequate disclosure are at odds with the attorney's goal
of confidentiality. For over thirty years there has been an inability to
harmonize these differences.9 6 With continued uncertainty in the financial markets creeping into financial statement reporting, this predicament is unacceptable. The auditor wants the attorney to evaluate
claims and provide a number that the auditors can rely upon in
evaluating the financial statement disclosures. Because of the attorney's
obligations to adhere to the ABA's Statement of Policy, the auditor is
often placed between the "rock" of evaluating a client's treatment of
pending litigation as appropriate within the confines of GAAP without
sufficient evidence from a client's attorneys to support such a claim and
the "hard place" of qualifying or even disclaiming its opinion on a
client's financials for reasons of scope limitation. Regardless of
Sarbanes-Oxley and the demands of the U.S. investor, it is unlikely that
93.
15 U.S.C. § 7242(a) (2006).
94. Improper Influence on Conduct of Audits, Exchange Act Release No. 47,890,
Investment Company Act Release No. 26,050, 80 SEC Docket 770 (May 20, 2003).
For a more detailed discussion of the potential liabilities for making misleading
statements to auditors, see Egan, supra note 39, at 144-54.
95. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2-2 (2009).
96.

See ABA Statement ofPolicy, supra note 72.
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the ABA is going to change its stance on letters of audit inquiry in the
foreseeable future. 97

Commentators have suggested three possible solutions to this
dilemma. One approach calls for the "reeducation" of attorneys, auditors and the courts. 98 Regarding attorneys, this reeducation would
include a revision of the ABA Statement of Policy "to make it less
hostile to the process." 99 With regard to auditors, it would require an
expansion of the audit inquiry letter to solicit more information that
might be available in order to encourage disclosure of potential loss
contingencies. 00 Finally, with respect to the courts, the reeducation is
simply a suggestion that the court decisions over the past twenty years
concerning this area be changed.101 Given the more than thirty years
that the ABA Statement of Policy has been in effect, any change will be
slow and minimal. Moreover, any change will inevitably have a
negative impact on the most sacred foundations of the legal professionthe attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine. Thus, this
reeducation process is unlikely to be a successful solution.
A second approach is based on an expansion of privilege to include
the auditor and client in a manner similar to that enjoyed by attorneys. 102
While an auditor is subject to professional and ethical requirements to
protect the confidentiality of client information, 103 and while some states
104
have recognized various forms of accountant/auditor-client privilege,
the federal courts10 5 have not.10 6 Moreover, the PCAOB has publicly
97. See James Johnson, The Accountable Attorney: A Proposal to Revamp the
ABA's 1976 Statement of Policy Regarding Lawyers' Responses to Auditors' Requests
for Information, 14 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REv. 27, 33-34 (2007) (discussing the reform

momentum generated by the requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the legal
profession's refusal to change its position as stated in the ABA Statement of Policy).
98.
M. Eric Anderson, Talkin' 'Bout My Litigation-How the Attorney Responsible
to an Audit Inquiry Letter Discloses as Little as Possible, 7 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J.

Bus. L. 143, 167 (2005).
99.

Id.

100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Col6n, supra note 61, at 143.
103. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT R. 301 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub.
Accountants 1992).
David M. Greenwald, Corporate Governance-Transparency in Financial
104.
Reporting Without Waiving a Corporation'sPrivileges, SLO81 ALI-ABA 1261, 1264-

65 (2006); Gideon Mark & Thomas C. Pearson, Corporate Cooperation During
Investigations and Audits, 13 STAN. J. L. Bus. & FIN. 1, 20 (2007).

105.

For a discussion of the attempt by Congress to create an attorney-client type
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stated that it will not recognize such a privilege.10 7 Given this hostility
from the regulatory side, expansion of privilege to include auditors
seems unlikely, particularly when the federal government continues to
apply pressure to waive the attorney-client privilege and work product
08
doctrine in criminal cases. 1
A third approach calls for a report by an independent legal counsel
in response to the auditor's request for information.' 0 9 Under this
approach, an independent attorney would review the litigation and
claims threatened or asserted against the client and provide an opinion
that the financial statement disclosure "presents fairly, in all material
respects, the legal contingencies" of the company as of a specific date." 0
In theory, this approach would preserve the attorney-client privilege
because information gathered from the client's various attorneys would
never be disclosed to outside legal counsel."' Moreover, because of his
legal training, the independent attorney is in a better position than the
auditor to evaluate the merits of the claims asserted and the probable and
potential losses the client might face." 2

privilege that applies to accountants and other tax practitioners in the context of noncriminal proceedings before the Internal Revenue Service and the federal courts, see
Steven J. Arsenault & W. R. Koprowski, Tax PractitionerPrivilege: A Safety Net with
Many Holes, 63 PRACTICAL TAX STRATEGIES 12 (1999).
106. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 817 (1984); Couch v.
United States, 409 U.S. 322, 344 (1973). See Mark & Pearson, supra note 104, at 20;
Thomas J. Molony, Is the Supreme Court Ready to Recognize Another Privilege? An
Examination of the Accountant-Client Privilege in the Aftermath of Jaffee v. Redmond,
55 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 247 (1988).
107. Mark & Pearson, supra note 104, at 20; Rules on Investigations and
Adjudications, PCAOB Release No. 2003-015, at app. 2, A2-33-34 (Sept. 29, 2003).
108. Many commentators have discussed in detail the policies of the U.S.
Department of Justice and other regulatory agencies that attempt to induce corporations
and other business entities to waive the attorney-client privilege and work product
protection, particularly in the context of criminal investigations. For a detailed
discussion of these efforts and the public criticism of these policies that followed, see
Brodsky, supra note 55, at 94-98. See generally U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL (2008).
109. Johnson, supra note 97, at 48-49.
110. Id. at 49. This language reflects the language generally used by CPAs in
issuing their opinion as to the fairness of a company's financial statements. See
REPORTS ON AUDITED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS, Statement on Auditing Standards No.
98, § 508.08 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1989).
111.
Johnson, supra note 97, at 48.
112. Id. at 48-49.
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One concern with this approach, however, is whether it would
actually solve the problem. The attorney-client privilege only applies to
13
communications to attorneys in the context of legal representation.'
The independent attorney whose sole task is to review the claims against
the client and issue an opinion on the fairness of management's disclosures of those claims is arguably not providing legal representation,
but rather is serving as a de facto auditor. Thus, whether this solution
would actually protect information subject to the attorney-client
privilege and work product doctrine is questionable at best.
Even if this approach does successfully preserve the attorney-client
privilege and work product protection, it still has its share of other
problems. Inserting an independent attorney into the review process
would be unwieldy, adding yet another layer of review to a process that
is often subject to significant time constraints. In addition, hiring an
the
independent attorney to serve as a de facto-auditor with regard to114
audit.
the
to
costs
significant
add
client's litigation disclosures would
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Considering the problems with the various approaches discussed
above,"' none appears to offer an effective solution to the problem. The
common denominator among these approaches is a focus on law-based
solutions: reeducating attorneys, expanding the attorney-client privilege
and work product protection to include auditors, and the use of independent legal counsel. It seems clear that it is unlikely that there will be
any change in the legal profession's approach to this issue. We believe,
therefore, that any solution must lie on the auditor's side of the equation.
Unlike other areas of the audit, such as inventory or accounts
receivable, where the auditor is able to confirm the balances of such
accounts and the accuracy of the financial statement disclosures of those
balances, the situation regarding legal contingencies is very different.
Because the attorney is unwilling or unable to sufficiently disclose
information to the auditors concerning pending litigation, the auditor is
required to express an opinion on the company's financial statements
See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
113.
The independent attorney is also subject to the same liability issues under
114.
Sarbanes Oxley § 303(a) that the client's regular attorneys already face. See supra
notes 93-95 and accompanying text. This potential liability will further increase the
already high costs of the audit.
115. See supra notes 98-114 and accompanying text.
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without knowing whether they possess the requisite information to
justify such an opinion. In such cases, where the requisite information is
unavailable or insufficient, accounting and auditing standards require the
auditor to issue a qualifying or disclaiming opinion, depending on the
materiality of the incomplete information. However, determining the
materiality of the incomplete information is impossible without knowing
the extent of the missing information. Consequently, a large number of
audit opinions may be incorrectly expressing an opinion on the fair
presentation of the financial statements concerning these contingent
liabilities posed by pending litigation.
Our recommendation is that the auditor should consider limiting the
scope of the audit to recognize the inherent limitation of the information
available to the auditor concerning legal matters. While this approach
does not resolve the communication conflict between the auditor and the
attorney, it does signal to investors, lenders and others relying on the
company's financial statements that the auditor is unable to render an
opinion on these matters. In such cases, limiting the scope of the audit
opinion is a far more transparent and honest approach than the current
vague and uncertain nature of current disclosures.

